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The Persistence of Corruption 
and Slow Economic Growth
PAOLO MAURO*
There is increasing recognition that corruption has substantial, adverse effects on
economic growth. But if the costs of corruption are so high, why don’t countries
strive to improve their institutions and root out corruption? Why do many countries
appear to be stuck in vicious circles of widespread corruption and low economic
growth, often accompanied by ever-changing governments through revolutions and
coups? A possible explanation is that when corruption is widespread, individuals
do not have incentives to fight it even if everybody would be better off without it.
Two models involving strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria attempt
to illustrate this formally. [JEL O40, H5, D73]
A
consensus seems to have emerged that corruption and other aspects of poor
governance and weak institutions have substantial, adverse effects on eco-
nomic growth. Nevertheless, many countries seem to be unable to improve their
institutions and curb corruption. Economists and policymakers have long recog-
nized that institutions matter in determining economic performance.1 The modern
economic literature on rent seeking has analyzed the relationship between trade
distortions, rent seeking behavior, and economic inefficiencies (Krueger, 1974).
North (1990) has argued that weak property rights may worsen a country’s eco-
nomic performance. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) have suggested that
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1Similarly, political scientists have long recognized that economic variables affect institutional
performance (Hibbs, 1973).countries where talented people are allocated to rent-seeking activities will tend to
grow more slowly. The recent availability of indices of corruption has stimulated a
flurry of empirical studies (for example, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón,
1999; Knack and Keefer, 1995; and Mauro, 1995) that have generally concluded that
the economic costs of corruption and weak governance are substantial. In the policy
arena, several initiatives have been undertaken in an effort to reduce corruption: one
such example is the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions. International organizations
also have become much more openly involved in promoting good governance.2
Despite a fairly clear understanding of the causes and consequences of corrup-
tion, and renewed attention on the part of policymakers, countries’ relative degree
of corruption has proved to be remarkably persistent. Some countries appear to be
stuck in a bad equilibrium characterized by pervasive corruption with no sign of
improvement. Interestingly, other countries experience corruption to an extent that
seems to be much lower, and persistently so.
One reason why rooting out corruption is so difficult may be that when cor-
ruption is widespread, it just does not make sense for individuals to attempt to fight
it, even if everybody would be better off if corruption were eliminated. Consider
for example the case of a civil servant in an administration where everybody,
including his superiors, is very corrupt. It would be difficult for this civil servant
to decline offers of bribes in exchange for favors because his superiors may expect
a portion of the bribe for themselves.3 By contrast, in bureaucracies that are gener-
ally honest, a real threat of punishment deters individual civil servants from behav-
ing dishonestly. This is an example of a strategic complementarity, whereby if one
agent does something it becomes more profitable for another agent to do the same
thing. Models involving strategic complementarities lead to multiple equilibria—in
this case a good equilibrium with low corruption, and a bad equilibrium with per-
vasive corruption.
Several authors have pointed to strategic complementarities as a major factor in
determining a country’s institutional efficiency and economic performance. Putnam
(1993) has argued that a tragedy of the commons may explain the institutional and
economic failure of some Italian regions. Strategic complementarities have received
attention previously in the context of formal models of corruption but have not been
explicitly related to economic growth. Andvig and Moene (1990) have emphasized
that the expected profitability of corruption from an individual point of view is a pos-
itive function of the degree to which a society as a whole is corrupt.4 They have
shown that this may lead to multiple self-fulfilling equilibrium levels of corruption.
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2Aweb guide and access point to many publications regarding the IMF’s approach to promoting good
governance and other policy initiatives (including the OECD Convention) is available via the Internet at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm.
3Wade (1982) provides a classic description of a bureaucracy in which corruption was systemic and
bribes were shared among various civil servants at all levels in the hierarchy.
4Andvig and Moene (1990) explore the implications of the assumption that the probability a corrupt
official will be reported to higher authorities is a decreasing function of the proportion of his colleagues
who are also corrupt. See also Cadot (1987), Dawid and Feichtinger (1996), and Huang and Wu (1994).Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) have shown that increasing returns in rent seek-
ing activities may generate multiple equilibria in rent seeking and income levels.5
Strategic complementarities are consistent with the observation that the
degree of institutional efficiency is extremely persistent over time. Putnam (1993)
shows that the ranking of Italian regions by “civicness” is almost the same today
as it was a century ago.6 In the cross-country context, indices of corruption or
institutional strength, which are available for the past two or three decades, also
tend to be very stable over time.
Multiple equilibria and strategic complementarities are one, perhaps intuitively
appealing, way of understanding the persistence of corruption, but other studies have
used different approaches. Tirole (1996) analyzes the interaction between the reputa-
tion of a group and its individual members. As individuals’ actions cannot be per-
fectly observed, their reputations depend partly on the past behavior of the group to
which they belong. Individuals who belong to a group with a reputation for being cor-
rupt will therefore have a strong incentive to be corrupt too. This generates his-
tory-dependence as corruption is perpetuated within a group: indeed temporary
increases to corruption may not subside even after the generations that committed the
original sin have by and large disappeared. In a related vein, Sah (1988 and 1991)
explains differences in crime participation rates across otherwise similar societal
groups on the basis of learning models in which it is easier to observe members of
one’s own group, and in which individuals’present behavior is affected by the behav-
ior of past generations. These papers emphasize an intergenerational aspect that is not
addressed in this paper and do not focus on multiple equilibria. Nevertheless, they
rely on the interaction between a group’s behavior and individual behavior. More
generally, persistent differences in economic performance across countries have been
analyzed by Azariadis (2001), Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996), and Matsuyama
(1996) using models in which adverse initial conditions may lead to poverty traps.
This paper presents two models based upon strategic complementarities, in an
attempt to formalize the general observation that some countries seem to be stuck
in a bad equilibrium characterized by both widespread corruption and slow eco-
nomic growth. The two models are complementary, as they view corruption from
slightly different angles.
The first model (Section I) displays multiple equilibria in corruption and
growth. Its contribution is to obtain this result in the context of a modern growth
model. Individuals allocate their time between productive work activity and theft
from government expenditure. In turn, the services resulting from government
expenditure enter the production function as in Barro (1990). The model draws on a
strategic complementarity similar to that analyzed by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny
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5A somewhat related literature analyzes the broader issue of agents’ choice between directly produc-
tive and appropriative activities (see Skaperdas, 1992, and references therein). For example, Skaperdas
(1992) considers a two-person game and finds an equilibrium in which neither player invests in weapons,
and an equilibrium in which the players engage in conflict.
6Putnam (1993) defines “civicness” as the extent to which citizens cooperate rather than free-ride and
interact as equals rather than as patrons and clients. He measures “civicness” as a composite index of
objective measures such as the number of recreational and cultural associations. He finds this index to be
significantly associated with both bureaucratic efficiency and income levels.(1993): if many people steal, then the probability of any one of them being caught
will be low. Thus there will be a “good” equilibrium characterized by absence of
corruption and high rates of investment and growth; and a “bad” equilibrium char-
acterized by pervasive corruption and low investment and growth. Slow growth and
low investment in the bad equilibrium result from (i) the waste of labor hours spent
on unproductive transfer of resources, in the spirit of the initial literature on rent
seeking, and (ii) a low marginal product of capital, because a lower proportion of
government expenditure reaches the production processes of which it is an input.
The second model (Section II) displays multiple equilibria in corruption, polit-
ical instability, and economic growth. One of its objectives is to suggest that
corruption and political instability may be two sides of the same coin.7 The contri-
bution of the model resides in its linking corruption and politicians’horizons and
drawing the implications of this link for economic growth. The model considers a
game among politicians, each of whom has to decide what kind of private bribe col-
lection system he wishes to set up. In doing so, politicians have to take into account
the fact that if they hurt the economy, then citizens will not reelect them, so that
they will no longer be able to collect bribes in the future. The strategic comple-
mentarity in the model can be described in intuitive terms as follows. Individuals
A and B are members of the same government. Suppose that A is very corrupt and
has established a private bribe-collection system for his own gain. The need to pay
substantial bribes reduces entrepreneurs’incentives to invest and imposes a signif-
icant burden on economic growth. Citizens realize that economic growth is being
harmed by the corrupt government, though they may not know exactly who is
soliciting bribes. Therefore, they decide not to reelect the government. This short-
ens B’s horizon, making him more inclined to extract a large share of current out-
put and to disregard any ensuing adverse effects on future output. In other words,
B will seek to obtain a large slice of the cake today and disregard policies aimed at
increasing the size of the cake tomorrow, since he knows that the government he
participates in will soon be ousted. If, on the other hand, A does not collect bribes,
then—following similar reasoning—B will also refrain from doing so.
Not surprisingly, these models do not provide magic bullets or precise policy
conclusions, but they do yield some interesting results. One broad conclusion,
as is often the case with models involving strategic complementarities and multi-
ple equilibria, is that gradual reforms are less likely to work than more ambi-
tious, comprehensive reforms. Another conclusion is that countries left to their
own devices may be unable to get out of the vicious circles they seem to be stuck
in. This may strengthen the case for outside bodies or nongovernmental organiza-
tions to press governments to undertake ambitious reforms.
Comparative static exercises also suggest that, other things equal, the range of
parameters for which a bad steady state with low growth and widespread corrup-
tion exists is wider when productivity is low and the public sector is large. These
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7More generally, this is an illustration of how various aspects of institutional inefficiency (in this case,
corruption and political instability) are mutually reinforcing. This has already been emphasized by
Krueger (1993) and De Soto (1989) with respect to corruption and red tape: they argue that corrupt bureau-
crats will intentionally introduce new regulations and red tape in order to be able to extract more bribes by
threatening to deny permits.results are consistent with empirical evidence that, on the basis of indices of cor-
ruption produced by rating agencies, richer countries tend to be perceived as having
lower corruption (Mauro, 1995), and a widely held view that large public sectors
and pervasive government intervention may be associated with greater corruption
(Tanzi, 1998). Policies aimed at improving transparency also help curb corruption
and improve growth. The remainder of this paper presents the two models and, in
Section III, provides a few concluding remarks.
I. A Model of Multiple Equilibria 
in Corruption and Economic Growth
A continuum of individuals indexed by i ∈ [0,1] are assumed to maximize
where ci is consumption by individual i and σ is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Population is assumed constant and is normalized to 1.
At each instant, individuals have one unit of labor services available, and they
allocate it between productive work, L, and theft from the government, S:
Government expenditure enters the production function as an input, as in Barro
(1990). Government expenditure may be appropriated by rent seekers, however,
who are then able either to consume the proceeds or to invest them in their own
firms. Real-world examples of individuals appropriating government expenditure
include the following. Civil servants may be persuaded to shirk on their official
jobs and, instead, work (or do favors) for somebody’s private business. Apolice-
man who is paid to protect all the shops in a neighborhood may be given a bribe
to look after one shop only. Funds that are earmarked for public infrastructure pro-
jects end up in the pockets of corrupt individuals. The cement that was going to
be used to build a highway may be stolen and used by corrupt individuals to build
their villa at the seaside instead. One of the most extreme real-world examples
of theft of productive public infrastructure, according to Abbott (1988, p. 172),
involves Luckner Cambronne, a member of the elite that ruled Haiti under the
Duvaliers. He apparently had his workmen pull up and carefully store the entire rail
system linking Port-au-Prince to Verrettes via St. Marc; he then sold the 150 kilome-
ters of railroad as scrap metal and pocketed the money for himself.
The total amount of resources that had been intended as government expendi-
ture but are instead extracted by individual i is
where  In other words, that amount depends on the time that i spends steal-
ing, Si, and on the amount of productive government expenditure available, G. φ( ) S
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5represents the proportion of stolen resources that the rent seeker actually keeps. The
latter is assumed to be a positive function of  , the total rent-seeking activity in
the economy.8This “strength in numbers” feature of rent seeking reflects the idea that
when many people steal, the probability of any one of them being caught is low.9
Such an effect is here modeled in a nonstochastic context by assuming that the more
theft activity is taking place, the lower the proportion of stolen resources that the
police will be able to recover. This strategic complementarity in the individuals’deci-
sion on the time to be spent stealing is a necessary condition for multiple equilibria.10
The production function for firm j is
where Kj is the capital stock belonging to firm j. The function is similar to that in
Barro (1990), with G representing productive government expenditure. As men-
tioned above,  φ( ) is the amount stolen that therefore fails to reach the produc-
tion processes for which it was intended as an input.11 Following Barro (1990),
it is assumed that the government’s policy is to set government expenditure to
be a constant fraction of output, (G/Y), and to maintain a balanced budget, that is
τ=G/Y, where τ is the (constant) tax rate.12
Capital belonging to individual i evolves according to
The equilibrium wage, w, and rental rate on capital, r, are given by the marginal
products of labor and capital, respectively:
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8This analysis ignores congestion effects in the theft technology. One might argue that the marginal
product of rent seeking ought to be lower, the higher the total amount of theft activity, as the amount
of G available for each rent seeker to steal falls when everybody is stealing from G. As long as this effect
becomes predominant only at high levels of total theft activity, one may conjecture that the qualitative
results of the present analysis would not be affected.
9See Murphy and others (1993).
10See Cooper and John (1988).
11It is assumed that S – φ (S –) < 1.
12Barro (1990) shows that it is optimal for the government to set government expenditure to be a con-
stant proportion of output.and that ∂γ/∂L > 0.13 It can also be shown that the investment rate is unambiguously
a positive function of L. The greater the extent to which people are engaged in pro-
ductive work rather than rent seeking, the higher the marginal product of capital
and thus the growth rate. In fact, (a) more labor is supplied and (b) more produc-
tive government expenditure reaches the processes where it is an input.14 It is now
necessary to find the equilibrium values of L. Each individual compares the net
wage, α(1 −τ )(Y/L), with the marginal product of rent seeking, G φ( ). Using the
fact that (G/Y) =τ , the comparison is between α (1 −τ ) τ −1 L−1 and φ(1 − L). There
will be a steady state at the corner L = 1 (the “good” steady state) if15
For example, this is always a steady state when φ(0) = 0, that is, in the case where,
if nobody is stealing, then the police are able to recover everything that an indi-
vidual might attempt to steal.
To look for interior solutions, the following equates the net wage with the
marginal product of rent seeking:
For simplicity, consider the case where φ(.) takes the linear functional form
It is assumed that
in order to ensure that
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13The welfare of the representative consumer is monotonic in the growth rate. The expression for wel-
fare can be rearranged so that L affects it only through the growth rate. The proof is the same as for the
Barro (1990) model. Thus, higher L unambiguously implies higher welfare.
14It can be shown that the growth rate would be a monotonically positive function of L even if the
investment rate were exogenously given and constant, because L affects positively the Y/K ratio through
mechanisms (a) and (b).
15The opposite corner is not locally stable: at L = 0 (where everybody would be dead anyway) the
wage is extremely high, and higher than the marginal product of rent seeking, so that people would wish
to increase their supply of productive work.To look for interior solutions with the linear functional form, consider the follow-
ing equation:
The solutions to this quadratic equation are
Thus, there are several possible cases, depicted in Figure 1:
• If the wage is always above the marginal product of rent seeking (MPRS), then
the only steady state is the corner L = 1 (Panel A).
• If there are two real solutions to the quadratic equation above, that is, two inter-
sections between the curves representing the wage and the marginal product of
rent seeking, then there are three possible situations:
▪ if L2 < L1 < 1, then there is a locally stable interior steady state (L2), which will
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Figure 1. Number of Steady Statesand the corner steady state, L = 1 (Panel B); this case is characterized by the
presence of multiple steady states;
▪ if 1 < L2 < L1, then the only steady state is the corner L = 1 (Panel C);
▪ if L2 < 1 < L1, then the only steady state is the locally stable interior solution,
L2 (Panel D).
L1 is locally unstable, whereas L2 is locally stable. This is suggested by consid-
ering how a small deviation from the average amount of work chosen (versus
rent seeking) affects the individual supply of work. Starting from L1, an increase
(decrease) in the average amount of work will lead the individual to increase
(decrease) his or her supply of work, thus reinforcing the initial change. On the other
hand, starting from L2, an increase (decrease) in the average amount of work will
lead the individual to decrease (increase) his or her supply of work, thus
counteracting the initial change.16
More precisely, an intuitive argument suggesting that L1 is unstable, whereas
L2 is stable, is as follows. Consider how an increase in L affects the difference
between the wage and the individual marginal product of rent seeking, that is, the
expression
at L1 and L2. That is, we are interested in the sign of the derivative with respect to
L of the expression immediately above. The government’s policy is to choose a tax
rate τ and to maintain a balanced budget, τ=(G/Y). As the average amount of work
versus rent seeking rises, output rises because more productive work is supplied
and a higher proportion of G actually reaches the productive process. As Y rises,
total tax revenue rises and the government raises G by the same amount. G is an
expenditure flow and can thus be raised instantaneously. Therefore, it is necessary
to take into account that an increase in average L will cause an increase in G. On
the other hand, K cannot change instantaneously. Substituting for (G/K ) in the
expression immediately above, factoring out G, and recalling that at an equilibrium
point the wage is equal to the marginal product of rent seeking, the derivative of
the expression above with respect to L can be shown to be positive at L1 and nega-
tive at L2. Thus, starting from L1 (L2), an increase in L leads the net wage to rise
above (fall below) the marginal product of rent seeking and therefore causes each
individual to supply more (less) labor, thus reinforcing (counteracting) the initial
increase in the average amount of work.
In analyzing the comparative statics, three questions may be addressed: (i) what
is the range of parameters for which interior solutions exist? (does the bad steady
state exist?); (ii) what is the range of parameters for which the good steady state
(the corner L = 1) exists?; and (iii) how bad is the bad steady state? (how low
is L2?).
ατ
αα α α 11
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16It is assumed that, owing to convex adjustment costs, people can alter their levels of work versus
rent-seeking activity only gradually. Therefore, were there to be a change in the total amount of theft activ-
ity, individuals would not be able to jump to L = 0 or L = 1 immediately. In a deterministic model, such as
the present one, these adjustment costs do not affect the maximization problem.In order to have a richer comparative statics exercise, one can specify the
function φ(S) as
where increases in the parameter θ (hitherto set to θ=1 for simplicity) represent
increases in the profitability of rent seeking. Reductions in θ could be caused, for
example, by improvements in the state’s ability to protect public expenditure.17
It can be shown that—other things equal—hikes in τ worsen welfare in the
bad steady state, widen the range of parameters for which the bad steady state
exists, and reduce the range of parameters for which a corner L = 1 steady state
exists.18 In these respects, therefore, increases in taxation (and commensurate
increases in government spending) tend to be deleterious for corruption and eco-
nomic performance. The effects of an increase in τ operate through a number of
mechanisms: (a) there is more G available to be stolen; and (b) higher taxes lower
the net wage. A third effect of an increase in τ tends in the opposite direction: (c)
a higher G raises the marginal product of labor. However, (b) predominates over
(c), so that an increase in τ also will unambiguously have undesirable effects. (This
result might not be robust to using more general functional forms.) Increases in α
widen the range of parameters for which the good steady state exists and narrow
the range of parameters for which a bad steady state exists, but improve welfare
in the bad steady state. Finally, variables that enter φ(S) also affect the range of
parameters for which the good steady state and/or the bad steady state will exist
and contribute to determining how bad the bad steady state is. Increases in θ
increase the range of parameters for which interior solutions exist and worsen wel-
fare in the bad steady state. Increases in a increase the range of parameters for
which the bad steady state exists and reduce the range of parameters for which the
good steady state exists, but have ambiguous effects on L2. Changes in b have
ambiguous effects, depending on the other parameters.
Endogenizing the Government’s Behavior
This first model’s main objective is to explore a setup in which the government’s
behavior is taken as given. Specifically, key variables that have thus far been
assumed as exogenous include the tax rate, τ, and the share of government expen-
diture in output, G/Y, which are assumed to be equal, in line with the Barro (1990)
model. This modeling choice reflects a view of the world in which politicians do
not (even in the very long run) necessarily choose the size of government that max-
imizes welfare; rather, the size of government is determined by a variety of factors
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, one might wonder what tax rate the
φθ Sa b S ()=+ () ,
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17The model could be extended to analyze the problem of a government choosing the amount of pro-
ductive expenditure and the amount of expenditure devoted to protecting property rights (e.g., public
expenditure on the police force).
18All comparative static exercises in this paper are essentially based upon taking simple derivatives.
They are omitted for the sake of brevity but are available upon request.government would choose to maximize the welfare of the representative individ-
ual. While this paper does not seek to provide a complete answer, a few consider-
ations follow. In Barro’s (1990) original setup, the government chooses τ=G/Y =
α.19 In the present model’s slightly modified setup, a natural choice for the gov-
ernment would also be τ=G/Y =α . In fact, this maximizes the growth rate of out-
put and the welfare of the representative individual for the good equilibrium case
where L = 1.20 Thus if the government could guarantee that the economy ends up
in the good steady state, it would choose τ=αfor sure. The complication here is that
with τ=α , the bad steady state also exists for a reasonable range of parameters. By
choosing a tax rate lower than α, for certain parameter assumptions, the govern-
ment might be able to ensure that the bad steady state does not exist, even if wel-
fare would be lower than it would be at τ=αin the good steady state.21An analysis
of the circumstances under which agents would coordinate on the good steady state
rather than on the bad steady state (when both exist) is beyond the scope of this
paper. The more interesting question, however, is the following: suppose that the
government has chosen τ=αand the economy has found itself in a bad steady
state. Would it make sense for the government to reduce the tax rate to the largest τ
compatible with the existence of a good steady state only? For some parameter val-
ues, welfare in the good steady state with a lower tax rate would actually be higher
than in the bad state with τ=α . In those cases it would thus make sense for the gov-
ernment to reduce the tax rate and bring about a situation in which only the good
steady state exists. Yet it is unclear whether governments actually do this in prac-
tice. The next section analyzes a different model in an attempt to explain why a
government might not take measures aimed at reducing corruption even when it is
clear that everybody would be better off without corruption.
II. Multiple Equilibria in Corruption, Political Stability, and Growth
The previous model embedded strategic complementarities in a well-established
framework for analyzing economic growth in an infinite-horizon setting, but
abstracted from issues related to changes in government. This section develops a
simpler, two-period model, which emphasizes the role of different politicians within
a government and analyzes the possibility of government collapse. In this second
model, countries where politicians act noncooperatively will experience greater
corruption, lower political stability, and lower economic growth.
The government consists of a group of politicians, indexed by i = 1, . . . N.
At the start of the first period, each politician i decides whether he should set up
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11
19Barro (1990) shows that both a benevolent and a kleptocratic government would choose τ=G/Y =α .
Indeed, in a simple generalization of Barro’s model any relative weights on the utility of the representative
consumer and kleptocrats would yield the same optimal size of government (Mauro, 1996).
20For the good steady state to exist where τ=α , the following parameter restriction needs to be satis-
fied: a < 1 −α . This is a rather mild restriction: recall that a is the proportion of resources stolen that one
would retain when nobody else is stealing and 1 −αis labor’s share of output resulting from the produc-
tion function.
21Choosing a tax rate higher than α would not help, because it would increase the range of parameters
for which a bad steady state exists and reduce the range of parameters for which a good steady state exists.a system of bribe collection for his own private benefit and how high a bribe
rate, τi, he should levy. Once set up, the system and the bribe rate remain in place
until the end of the second period.22 Citizens can observe the total bribe rate, 
τ, where
as well as all other aggregate variables. However, they cannot observe who extracts
the bribes, that is, they do not know each individual politician’s τi, as long as 
τi < τM.23 If an individual politician levies a bribe higher than τM, it is assumed that
there will be a harsh punishment such that τM is effectively an upper bound on the
bribe rate in this model. Loosely speaking, policies aimed at increasing transparency
may be interpreted as attempts to reduce τM.24At the end of the first period, the cit-
izens decide whether or not to reelect the government (or whether or not to have a
revolution). For simplicity, both citizens and politicians have isoelastic utility, and
there is no discounting, that is, citizens’utility equals
where c1 and c2 are consumption in the first period and second period, respec-
tively, and σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The pro-
duction function is assumed to be linear, with technological parameter a: when a

























22According to the New York Times (November 8, 1992, sec. 6, p. 31), the administration of former
Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello is described as a highly complex and efficient system of cor-
ruption, “they established goals: by month x, we are going to net $500 million.” According to Wade
(1982), each level of the hierarchy in the administration of the irrigation system in South India obtained a
fixed percentage of the total bribe. Together with the systematic evidence on the persistence of institutional
efficiency, these examples suggest that once a corruption machine is set up, it takes time to change the
way it operates.
23When a given politician amasses a fortune (by levying τM or more), citizens will realize that this
individual is corrupt. According to the New York Times (November 8, 1992), former President Collor de
Mello’s acquisition of a palatial residence triggered a corruption scandal in Brazil, which ultimately cul-
minated in Mr. Collor de Mello’s impeachment.
24Many international institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have emphasized the
importance of transparency in fiscal and monetary accounts, and in the conduct of business more gener-
ally. See again the IMF’s website. A partial listing of NGOs that have been active in this area includes
Transparency International and recent initiatives by Global Witness and Mr. George Soros encouraging
multinational corporations (notably oil and other natural resource companies) to publish how much they
pay in royalties, taxes, and fees to each country they deal with. While in the model τM is the highest bribe
rate an individual politician can get away with, it is likely that this bribe rate would be reduced by poli-
cies aimed more generally at improving transparency.The Citizens’ Problem
(i) When they do not oust the government, citizens obtain lifetime utility equal to
where e is a citizen’s initial endowment. From the first-order condition, citizens save
(ii) When they do oust the government, citizens obtain
where λ is an efficiency loss (assumed to be multiplicative for simplicity) due to
having no government or a less experienced (and therefore less competent) gov-
ernment. If the incumbent government is overthrown by means of a revolution, it
is likely that production will be disrupted. Savings are
It can be shown that the citizens will oust the government if and only if λ < τ.
The Politicians’ Problem
(i) If the government is not ousted, politician i obtains lifetime utility equal to
where ep is the politician’s endowment in the second period.25
(ii) If the government is ousted, politician i obtains
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25Politicians are assumed to have an endowment in the second period so that their marginal utility of
consumption would not be infinite, were they to be ousted. One could assume that both citizens and politi-
cians obtain an endowment (possibly the same) in both periods. The current formulation is chosen merely
to simplify notation.The Cooperative Solution
Suppose that the politicians decide to hire an agent whose job is to set the total
bribe rate so as to maximize their utility, with the requirement that each politician
receive the same bribe rate. Then the agent will choose between (a) the maximum
τi compatible with reelection, λ/N, which for each politician yields lifetime utility
equal to the expression labeled (*); and (b) the maximum τi compatible with the
politicians not being caught, τM (assumed larger than λ/N), which yields lifetime
utility equal to the expression labeled (**) for each politician. Thus, the coopera-
tive solution will be τi =λ/N ∀i if utility is higher under (a) than it is under (b).
If, on the other hand, utility is lower under (a) than it is under (b), then the agent
will choose τi =τ M ∀i.
Noncooperative Solutions
Only symmetric solutions will be considered in what follows. No equilibrium can
be such that τ < λ, because if all politicians j ≠ i were levying a bribe rate below λ/N,
then politician i would be able to levy more than λ/N without making the govern-
ment collapse. No symmetric equilibrium can be such that λ < τ < NτM, because if
all politicians j ≠ i were levying a bribe rate above λ/N, then politician i would
know that the government was going to collapse regardless of his actions, and he
would therefore levy τM.26
The bad equilibrium
One Nash equilibrium is where all politicians levy a bribe rate equal to τM. In fact,
if all politicians j ≠ i are levying a bribe rate equal to τM, then politician i also wants
to levy τM, because he knows that the government is going to collapse anyway. In
this bad equilibrium, the investment rate and the growth rate are low, the govern-
ment is ousted, and the bribe rate is as high as it can possibly be.
The good equilibrium
Another Nash equilibrium is where all politicians levy a bribe rate equal to λ/N,
but only under certain parameter assumptions. Supposing that all politicians j ≠ i
are levying λ/N, politician i faces a choice between the utility levels in the expres-
sions labeled (*) and (**) above. If the parameters are such that the utility level in
(*) is higher than it is in (**), then politician i, too, is better off levying λ/N than
he would be levying τM, implying that λ/N is a Nash equilibrium. In this good equi-
librium, the investment rate and the growth rate are relatively high, the government
is reelected, and the bribe rate is relatively low. If, on the other hand, the utility
level in (*) is smaller than it is in (**), then there is no good equilibrium.
Paolo Mauro
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26Under certain conditions, politician i would be able to save the government from collapsing by
accepting a bribe lower than λ/N, and still be better off than by levying τM. However, this would not be a
symmetric equilibrium.Thus, if the utility level in (*) is higher than that in (**), the model displays
multiple equilibria; if the utility level in (*) is smaller than that in (**), only the
bad equilibrium exists. It can be shown that savings, growth, and the welfare of
both citizens and politicians are higher in the good equilibrium than in the bad one.
The strategic complementarity in the model can be described in intuitive terms,
as follows. If the individual politician decides to set a high bribe rate, he hurts the
economy and makes it less likely that the other politicians will be reelected. By
doing so he reduces the expected length of their horizons. As a consequence, all
other politicians will be more inclined to levy a high bribe rate too. Thus, an indi-
vidual politician’s decision to be corrupt shortens the other politicians’horizons. It
makes them more willing to obtain a large slice of the cake today, disregarding the
size of the cake tomorrow, as they know they will not be reelected. This mechanism
makes multiple equilibria possible. The model is consistent with the empirical obser-
vation that corruption, political instability, and low investment and growth tend
to be correlated.
Comparative static exercises suggest that economic, institutional, and politi-
cal variables, and even preferences contribute to determining whether a good equi-
librium can exist, and how high welfare is under the two types of equilibria. A
good equilibrium will exist if utility is higher under (*) than it is under (**).
This is more likely to happen when τM is low, that is, when it is easy to catch
corrupt politicians. A lower τM also improves citizens’welfare in the bad equilib-
rium. As mentioned above, a variety of policies may be interpreted as tending to
reduce τM. For example, policies aimed at increasing transparency could make it
more difficult for individual politicians to hide their bribe revenues. For a given λ
and τM, a decrease in N also raises the likelihood that the good equilibrium will
exist and improves the bad equilibrium. (This result might not be robust to gener-
alizing the model.) The fewer the members of the elite, the more likely it is for a
good equilibrium to exist and the lower the total bribe rate in the bad equilibrium.
A sufficient condition for an increase in λ to raise the likelihood that a good equi-
librium will exist is that λ < 0.5 and σ > 1. Thus, under these reasonable parame-
ter assumptions, an increase in λ (the productivity loss attached to ousting the
government) raises the likelihood of the good equilibrium, but lowers citizens’
welfare in both the good and the bad equilibrium. When discounting is intro-
duced in the model, increases in the extent to which second-period utility is dis-
counted reduce the likelihood that the good equilibrium will exist. Finally, it can
be shown that utility is likely to be higher under (*) than it is under (**), and
therefore a cooperative solution is more likely, when a (the technological effi-
ciency parameter) is high. This is consistent with empirical evidence based upon
subjective indices, which shows that corruption tends to be higher in poor coun-
tries than it is in rich countries (Mauro, 1995).
III. Concluding Remarks
This paper is motivated by the observation that some countries appear to be stuck in
a vicious circle of widespread corruption and low economic growth, often accompa-
nied by ever-changing governments through revolutions and coups. Indeed, existing
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slow growth, as well as between corruption and political instability; and that coun-
tries’ relative degree of corruption is highly persistent over the years. Never-
theless, despite increasing recognition that corruption has substantial adverse effects
on economic growth, governments seem to be unable to break that vicious circle.
Apossible explanation analyzed in this paper is that when corruption is wide-
spread, individuals do not have incentives to fight it even if everybody would be
better off without it. The paper has presented two models that rely on strategic
complementarities to obtain multiple equilibria. The first model embeds the strate-
gic complementarity of Murphy and others (1993) into the Barro (1990) model of
economic growth with government expenditure in the production function. When
other people are stealing from the government, an individual will base his deci-
sions not only on a lower marginal product of working in legal activities, but also
a higher marginal product of stealing (because the chances that he will be caught
are lower). As a result, it will be profitable for him to allocate more time to rent
seeking, and less time to productive activities. The model thus obtains multiple
equilibria in corruption and growth. The second model brings political instability
into the picture by focusing on the interaction among politicians and the impact of
one politician’s corruption on another politician’s corruption through the proba-
bility of reelection of the government. By doing so, it obtains multiple equilibria in
corruption, political instability, and economic growth.
The two models are similar in their reliance on strategic complementarities, but
they also view corruption from different angles. The first model emphasizes the
role of individuals stealing from the government and may be interpreted as allow-
ing for both petty corruption (paying a bribe to obtain a driver’s license) and grand
corruption (paying a bribe to build a highway with substandard materials). The
second model emphasizes the role of (individual members of) the government
stealing from the public and may be interpreted as focusing squarely on grand cor-
ruption. The models are presented together because both views of corruption seem
to be relevant, consistent, and complementary.
This is not the first paper to analyze the persistence of corruption, but it does
attempt to go beyond existing studies by embedding multiple equilibria in corrup-
tion in a modern model of economic growth and, separately, by using strategic
complementarities to analyze the interaction between political instability and cor-
ruption among members of the government. Multiple equilibria are certainly not
the only way in which researchers have attempted to make sense of persistent cor-
ruption, and alternative approaches have shed light on different facets of this issue.
Nevertheless, most existing studies have relied on the interaction between individ-
ual incentives and group behavior and have thus been based on strategic comple-
mentarities in a broad sense.
One general policy implication of this paper is that gradual reforms are less
likely to work than more ambitious, comprehensive reforms. Another implica-
tion is that, without outside intervention, governments may be unable to break the
vicious circles their countries seem to be stuck in. This may strengthen the case
for outside bodies or nongovernmental organizations to press governments to
undertake ambitious reforms.
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16Comparative static exercises show that, other things equal, countries with
low productivity and a large public sector have a broader range of parameters for
which a bad steady state with low growth and widespread corruption exists, and
a narrower range of parameters for which a good steady state exists. These
results are consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that, on the basis of
indices of corruption produced by rating agencies, richer countries tend to be per-
ceived as having lower corruption, and a widely held view that large public sectors
and pervasive government intervention may be associated with greater corruption.
In addition, the analysis developed in this paper suggests that policies aimed at
improving transparency and, more generally, disseminating information that may
ultimately lead the public to identify corrupt members of the government are help-
ful in controlling corruption and fostering economic growth.
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